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Insider Trading Regulation of Law Firms:





In the first half of the 1980s, public debate raged over the condition
of America's financial markets. Corporate takeovers dominated the
headlines as battles were waged over the fate of major corporations.-
The increased use of high-risk, high-leverage financing via "junk" bonds2
caused uneasiness over whether such financial instruments were safe or
appropriate for large transactions like corporate takeovers.3 Many finan-
cial analysts and legislators were concerned that the collapse of a major
corporation as a result of enormous debt could create a chain reaction
* Member, Third Year Class. B.A. University of California, Berkeley, 1989. I would
like to thank my parents, Alfred and Laurie Wong, for their undying love and support. They
have allowed me to enjoy the fruits of higher education.
This Note won the 1992 Albert G. Evans Award in Private Enterprise. The award is
given for the best published Note or Article in the area of governmental regulation or private
enterprise.
1. See Hostile Takeovers" The Examination of the Need.for Reform of the Procedures
and Practices of Insider Trading, Financing of Hostile Takeovers and their Effects on the Econ-
omy and International Competitiveness: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous-
ing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1987).
2. The term "junk" bonds refers to bonds issued by companies with low credit ratings.
To compensate for such high risk, and to attract investors, these debt instruments usually offer
extremely high returns.
3. William Proxmire, What's Right and Wrong about Hostile Takeovers?, 1988 Wis. L.
Rnv. 353, 358-60. The former Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs quotes then-SEC Chairman John Shad's statement that "[tjhe greater the lever-
age, the greater the risk to the company, its shareholders, creditors, officers, employees, suppli-
ers, customers and others .... The more leveraged takeovers today, the more bankruptcies
tomorrow." Id. at 359 (quoting John Shad, The Leveraging of America, WALL ST. J., June 8,
1984, at 28).
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that would cripple the nation's markets. 4 Others were concerned about
takeovers because they produced huge movements in stock prices as in-
vestors speculated on the latest deals.5 Takeover-related stock price
movements created numerous opportunities for individuals with inside
information to "jump the gun" and trade prior to major corporate an-
nouncements, thereby profiting from the subsequent change in price.
As a result of takeover deals, many individuals intimately involved
in the negotiations were privy to confidential, material6 corporate infor-
mation. Among these individuals were the traditional corporate "insid-
ers,"' 7 such as a company's officers and directors, and "temporary
insiders" who acquired inside information through legitimate business
relations, such as members of investment banking firms and law firms
who had been hired as analysts and advisors to the deals.
At the height of the takeover craze large corporate law firms special-
izing in mergers and acquisitions performed legal services for the various
parties involved in these corporate acquisitions. In rendering their serv-
ices, the attorneys and employees of these law firms came into possession
of material, nonpublic information regarding impending corporate take-
overs. Often, this inside information proved lucrative to people willing to
disregard the federal securities laws concerning insider trading.
4. See Securities Markets Oversight and Drexel Burnham Lambert: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1988) ("The subcommittee is concerned about the liquidity of the
market in junk bonds in the event of an extended economic downturn.").
5. See Improper Activities in the Securities Industry: Hearing Before the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1987). "[T]he substantial
increase in the number of takeovers, including hostile takeovers ... [has] raised the rewards for
insider trading. The amount of money that you could make substantially increased and it...
raised the number of opportunities in which you could trade on inside information .... Id.
(statement of Rudolph W. Giuliani, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York).
6. The Supreme Court first defined the term "material" in the context of SEC Rule 14a-
9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1992), which pertains to proxy statements, in TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976). In TSC Industries, the Court stated:
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable share-
holder would consider it important in deciding how to [act] .... Put another way,
there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would
have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the total
mix of information made available.
Id. at 449 (footnote omitted).
The Court later applied this standard to insider trading cases in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,
485 U.S. 224 (1988). In Basic, the Court "expressly adopt[ed] the TSC Industries standard of
materiality for the § 10(b) [of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1988)] and Rule lob-5 [17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1992)] context." Id. at 232 (footnote omitted).
In this Note, the terms "material, nonpublic information" and "inside information" will
be used interchangeably.
7. See infra note 63.
8. See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
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In 1984, Congress, intending to put some bite into the Securities and
Exchange Commission's (SEC) arsenal of penalties, passed the Insider
Trading Sanctions Act of 19849 (ITSA). ITSA allowed the SEC to levy a
penalty of up to three times the amount of profit gained or loss avoided
from trading securities on material, nonpublic information. ITSA also
increased the maximum fine for criminal violations from $10,000 to
$100,000.10
Despite the passage of ITSA, insider trading worsened. During the
latter half of the 1980s, public confidence in Wall Street and the nation's
financial markets was shaken by both the behavior of the market and the
behavior of its participants. Inside dealing seemed to permeate the Wall
Street community. It appeared that every major institution, including
law firms, employed professionals who were involved in illicit trading,
often in connection with intricate conspiracies. The professionals in-
volved in these conspiracies included business journalists, 1 stock bro-
kers,12 and attorneys.' 3 Then, a series of highly publicized scandals
concerning serious violations of the federal securities laws were prose-
cuted in the courts and widely reported in the press.' 4 These scandals
involved very prominent members of the securities industry, representing
nearly every major Wall Street securities firm.' 5
The scandals also involved the legal community. For example, in
1987 a young partner at the firm of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz was
convicted for involvement in illicit trading.' 6 These scandals, including
later reports of the sophisticated insider dealings of Michael Milken, in-
9. Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984).
10. The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA) in-
creases this maximum to $1,000,000. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1988).
11. R. Foster Winans, reporter for the WALL STREET JOURNAL's Heard on the Street
column, was convicted of participation in an insider trading scheme based on information
misappropriated from a financial newspaper. U.S. v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986),
affd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
12. E.g., SEC v. Davidoff, No. 87 Civ. 2299, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2726 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
7, 1987).
13. E.g., SEC v. Grossman, Civ. Action No. 87-1031 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 1987); United
States v. David, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 93,025 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 21, 1986).
14. For an excellent account of the scandals, see JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES
(1991).
15. These scandals involved investment banker Dennis Levine of Drexel Burnham Lam-
bert, investment banker Martin Seigel of Kidder, Peabody & Co., arbitrageur Robert Freeman
of Goldman, Sachs, investment banker Robert Wilkis of Lazard Freres, arbitrageur Ivan F.
Boesky, attorney Ilan Reich of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, and "junk-bond" financier
Michael Milken. See SEC v. Siegel, No. 87 Civ. 0963 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 1987); SEC v. Bo-
esky, No. 86 Civ. 8767 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1986); SEC v. Levine, No. 86 Civ. 3726 (RO)
(S.D.N.Y. July 3, 1986).
16. Lawyer Sentenced to 366 days For Role in Levine Scandal, 19 See. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA), No. 5, at 170 (Jan. 30, 1987). The lawyer was sentenced to 366 days in jail and
received 5 years probation, and was fined $485,000 in civil penalties. Id.
July 1993]
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creased public skepticism about the fairness of the securities market with
respect to the public at large. 17
In addition to the scandals, the crash of the stock market on Octo-
ber 19, 1987, shook public confidence. The crash caused a worldwide
panic and raised questions about the stability of the American stock mar-
ket and the propriety of the small investor's involvement in it.18
Both the scandals and the market crash gave the investing public the
impression that the U.S. financial markets were unsafe. Perhaps most
troubling for the individual investor was the belief that the securities in-
dustry was ripe for fraud and abuse.
With the passage of time, Congress realized that the measures pro-
vided by ITSA were insufficient to deal with the mounting problems of
insider trading. In 1988, the House Committee on Energy and Com-
merce (House Committee) noted that "[d]espite the stiffer penalties en-
acted by Congress in 1984, the [intervening years between the passage of
ITSA and 1988] have seen a dramatic increase in insider trading cases,
including cases against some of the most prominent officials in Wall
Street investment banking firms." 19 In response, Congress enacted the
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (IT-
SFEA).20 Passed just four years after ITSA, ITSFEA was the second
attempt by Congress to deal with the increased public perception that the
nation's financial markets were unfair to the small investor.
ITSFEA provided a variety of measures to facilitate insider trading
enforcement.21 For example, to aid in the detection of insider trading
activity, ITSFEA authorized the SEC to offer bounties to persons who
provided significant information about securities violations. 22 ITSFEA
also imposed liability on "controlling persons" 23 for the insider trading
17. See generally CONNIE BRUCK, THE PREDATOR'S BALL: THE INSIDE STORY OF
DREXEL BURNHAM AND THE RE OF JUNK BOND RAIDERS (1989) (chronicling Milken's
activities).
18. See "Black Monday," The Stock Market Crash of October 19, 1987 Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1988).
"[A] basic principle [of our securities markets] is that we must preserve the confidence of
investors in the integrity and stability of the market. How many roller coaster days on Wall
Street can we have before investors, large and small, begin losing confidence in our securities
markets?" Id. at 2 (statement of William Proxmire, Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs).
19. See H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 11 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6044 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
20. Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1
(1988)).
21. The two major obstacles to the prevention of insider trading are the SEC's lack of
resources, and the difficulty of obtaining sufficient proof. See discussion infra Part II(A).
22. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21A(e) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(e)
(1988)).
23. See infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text for the definition of a "controlling
person."
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activities of persons under their supervision. 24 This aspect of ITSFEA
shifted some of the burden of monitoring individuals from the SEC to
employers.
This Note examines ITSFEA and the effect of the statute's definition
of "controlling-person liability" on the legal profession. It analyzes the
present state of the relevant law and suggests a proposal designed to ef-
fectuate the goals of ITSFEA and provide a clear and workable frame-
work for practicing attorneys, law firms, and law firm employees.
Part II of this Note discusses the aspects of ITSFEA which are rele-
vant to the legal profession, the problems that ITSFEA created, and the
regulatory void that it left unfilled. Part III examines the current regula-
tory landscape. It focuses on regulations applicable to lawyers and law
firms, including the securities fraud theories that most commonly affect
law firm employees, the current regulations of the legal community by
the SEC, and the most significant nationwide guidelines for attorney con-
duct. Finally, Part IV proposes that law firms should be required to
adopt, maintain, and enforce policies designed to prevent insider trading
by their employees. This proposal serves two purposes: (1) It establishes
high standards sufficient to protect the confidentiality of corporate infor-
mation; and (2) it provides law firms with clearer guidelines to give them
a better understanding of their responsibilities.
II. The Problems of ITSFEA and the Need for Regulatory
Clarity
A. The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988
In 1988, Congress passed ITSFEA in an attempt to improve the
detection and prevention of fraud in the trading of securities on secon-
dary markets. The House Committee recognized two weaknesses in the
SEC's battle against insider trading: a lack of resouces25 and the diffi-
culties involved in effectively prosecuting insider trading cases. 26 IT-
SFEA addressed these weaknesses by creating a bounty program2 7 to
help discover and prosecute insider trading, and by creating controlling-
24. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21A(b)(1) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
l(b)(1) (1988)).
25. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 19, at 14.
26. Id. at 15.
27. ITSFEA § 78u-l(e) provides, in pertinent part:
[T]here shall be paid from amounts imposed as a penalty under this section and
recovered by the Commission or the Attorney General, such sums, not to exceed 10
percent of such amounts, as the Commission deems appropriate, to the person or
persons who provide information leading to the imposition of such penalty.
This aspect of ITSFEA will not be a primary focus of this Note.
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person liability28 to help spread the responsibility and cost of detecting
insider trading violations.
The controlling-person scheme targeted firms participating in the se-
curities field because Congress decided that they should assume a height-
ened responsibility to safeguard the integrity of the financial markets.
Moreover, Congress delegated this responsibility and the imposition of
costs to firms because they are in the best position to monitor their em-
ployees and detect any wrongdoing. The firm's general duty to monitor
their employees also includes the duties of specific individuals within
these firms who have supervisory responsibilities. To this end, the House
Committee stated, "In the view of the Committee, firms whose lifeblood
is the continued public trust in our securities markets must do more to
share in the responsibility for policing those markets and should be sub-
ject to considerable penalties for a shirking of that responsibility. '29
Thus, ITSFEA shifted some of the responsibility for the initial detection
and prevention of securities fraud squarely onto the shoulders of securi-
ties businesses that directly benefit from the securities industry.
However, under ITSFEA, not all businesses bear the same responsi-
bilities. ITSFEA provides a dual standard of care for controlling per-
sons. For registered broker-dealers or investment advisers, liability
attaches if it is established that (1) the controlling person knowingly or
recklessly failed to establish, maintain, or enforce any policy or proce-
dure reasonably designed to prevent the misuse of material, nonpublic
information; and (2) the controlling person's failure substantially con-
tributed to or permitted the occurrence of the securities law violations.30
Other controlling persons are subject to a penalty only if they "knew
or recklessly disregarded the fact that" a person whom they controlled
was likely to engage in securities fraud and "failed to take appropriate
steps to prevent such acts before they occurred. '31 In other words, the
failure to establish, maintain, or enforce an insider trading policy need
not be the "but for" cause of the violation. Rather, it need only have
allowed the violation to occur or have assisted in the violation. 32 Serious
penalties face controlling persons who do not fulfill their responsibilities
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(b).
29. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 19, at 15.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(b)(1)(B). This section incorporates language from Securities Ex-
change Act § 15(f), which applies to registered broker-dealers, and § 204A of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 17u-l(b)(1)(B) (1990), which applies to registered invest-
ment advisers.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(b)(1)(A).
32. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 19, at 18. Many self-regulatory organizations have al-
ready adopted similar rules requiring enforcement policies and procedures. See, e.g., Ameri-
can Stock Exchange Rules 320, 922, 1 Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) 9374, 9722; NASD
Rules of Fair Practice, Art. III, § 27, N.A.S.D. Manual (CCH) 2177; NYSE Rule 342, 2
N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2343. For a complete discussion on self-regulatory organizations see
infra Part III.
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as required by ITSFEA. Congress established the fine for an ITSFEA
violation to be the greater of $1,000,000, or three times the amount of
profit gained or loss avoided.33
(1) Confusion Over Law Firm Responsibility
The dual standards of liability for broker-dealers and investment ad-
visers on the one hand, and controlling persons on the other, create
doubt about how ITSFEA's general recklessness standard should be in-
terpreted. The creation of two different standards indicates that Con-
gress did not intend to require non-securities firms to establish written
insider trading policies; instead, Congress subjected them to a less rigor-
ous general recklessness standard.34 The House Committee provided dis-
tinct guidelines for the non-securities firms when it stated:
The risk involved must be such that to disregard it would constitute a
gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person
would exercise in such a situation. For example, "recklessness" en-
compasses a heedless indifference as to whether circumstances sug-
gesting employee violations actually exist....
The controlling person is responsible under this subsection if it
fails to take an appropriate action once it knew or was reckless in disre-
garding indications that its controlled person was engaging in insider
trading.35
The language of the recklessness standard merely requires most firms to
respond to evidence of wrongful action, while broker-dealers and invest-
ment advisers are required to actively prevent such situations from ever
occurring. This House Committee report indicates that Congress in-
tended two differing standards of controlling-person liability.
However, some commentators believe that the two standards are not
so different despite the language found in the legislative history of IT-
SFEA. During his tenure as director of the SEC's Division of Enforce-
ment, Gary Lynch warned that "there could be a case where the mere
fact that a firm failed to establish any policies and procedures whatsoever
would be deemed to be reckless conduct."'36 With respect to public cor-
porations, which are only held to the recklessness standard, one com-
mentator has recommended that
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-I(a)(3). In addition to a fine of up to $1,000,000 and/or 10 years in
prison for "natural persons," section 32(a) of the Securities Exchange Act authorizes the impo-
sition of criminal penalties on "non-natural persons," such as a company, of up to $2,500,000.
15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1988).
34. The House Committee specifically rejected an aiding and abetting standard. HousE
REPORT, supra note 19, at 18.
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. Requirements of Insider Trading Act Go Beyond Securities Firms, Lynch Says, 21 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 65 (Jan. 13, 1989). See also Jonathan Eisenberg, Law Firms
Bewarel Recent Insider Trading Legislation Affects You Too, WAsH. LAW., Nov./Dec. 1989,
at 38, 40 ("[IThe failure to adopt policies and procedures may itself evidence recklessness.").
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[b]ecause the failure to adopt a policy is likely to be considered evi-
dence of reckless disregard for purposes of 1988 Act controlling-person
liability for employee insider trading, public corporations should pro-
mulgate and communicate a written policy against unlawful securities
trading, monitor compliance with the policy, and enforce sanctions for
noncompliance. 37
Under the present language of ITSFEA, law firms would do well to
heed this advice. As a result of the uncertainty surrounding the responsi-
bilities imposed on law firms by ITSFEA, a number of firms have imple-
mented policies and procedures designed to satisfy the stricter
standard.38 Whether these polices are sufficient is uncertain, since no
official guidelines exist and no firms have yet been charged with ITSFEA
violations due to inadequate prevention measures.
(2) Controlling-Person Liability
Law firms may be particularly susceptible to the vagaries found in
ITSFEA because of their lack of formal internal structuring. Law firms
rarely are organized along hierarchies common to most other corporate
organizations. Consequently, the chain of command often is not clearly
defined. Instead, law firms often are arranged into tiers of partners and
associates, or into teams. As a result, senior members of law firms may
be subject to liability under ITSFEA, but may not realize that they are
considered a controlling person.
SEC Rule 405 defines "control" as "the power to direct or cause the
direction of the management and policies of a person, whether through
the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise. ' 39 Thus,
the definition of "controlling person" "include[s] not only employers, but
any person with power to influence or control the direction or the man-
agement, policies, or activities of another person." 4 In fact, the House
Committee equated "control" with the mere power to control, regardless
of whether such power is actually exercised.41
Under ITSFEA's broad definition of control, lawyers and law firms
could be exposed to liability from a number of angles. First, the law firm
itself-the partnership or professional corporation--can be considered a
controlling person for each attorney or staff member.42 Second, individ-
ual attorneys who directly supervise other firm employees, attorney or
37. Alan M. Weinberger, Preventing Insider Trading Violations: A Survey of Corporate
Compliance Programs, 18 SEC. REG. L.J. 180, 190-91 (1990).
38. See Mitchell Tropin & Phyllis Diamond, Liability Concerns Prompt Law Firm Insider
Trading Procedures, 23 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 288 (Feb. 22, 1991). These
programs have met with varied success. See Herbert S. Wander, Insider Trading: How Law
Firms Can Protect Themselves, INSIGHT, Aug. 1987, at 9.
39. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1988).
40. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 19, at 17.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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otherwise, are considered controlling persons for ITSFEA purposes.43
For example, the failure of a senior partner to properly prevent a
subordinate from illegally trading on confidential client information
could result in ITSFEA liability for both the law firm and that particular
attorney. Third, a law firm's management committee, which has the
power to determine firm policy, could be considered a controlling person
because it is responsible for making policies of each employee.44
The potential liability for law firms and their individual members is
enormous. The lack of guidance and the vagueness of ITSFEA's lan-
guage has created much confusion and has resulted in varied and dispa-
rate attempts at solutions. However, no uniform guidelines exist to settle
the issue.
B. The Need for Improved Regulation of Attorney Conduct
Since lawyers and other law firm employees are often in a position to
improperly use or reveal confidential corporate information or trade se-
curities based on such information, there is abundant opportunity for the
occurrence of insider trading violations.45 However, beyond heightened
exposure to material, nonpublic corporate information, there are addi-
tional concerns about insider trading that support increased regulation
over law firms. Commissioner Philip Lochner commented that insider
trading violations by attorneys "should be viewed differently because of
the role that lawyers play in society." 46 Lochner attributes this higher
standard to a lawyer's sworn duty to uphold and defend the law, her
status as an officer of the court, and her role to act as an intermediary
between private citizens and the government. 47 In addition, Lochner be-
lieves that law firms may have an "ethical obligation" to report employ-
ees who engage in insider trading, even though the firms presently are
not legally obliged to do so. 48
43. Id.
44. SEC Chairman Richard Breeden has warned that "senior members of law firms, who
serve as 'controlling persons,' could be prosecuted under insider trading laws for failing to
prevent insider trading and tipping by others within the firm." SEC Finding Law Firms Lack
Safeguards to Deter Insider Trading, Breeden Says, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at
1375 (Sept. 28, 1990).
45. In 1991, SEC Commissioner Philip Lochner noted that while there is no data on
insider trading by specific occupational groups, "recent cases brought by the SEC indicate that
there are at least three groups that seem disproportionately to engage in insider trading. The
first two groups are securities professionals and lawyers. Both of these groups routinely obtain
material, nonpublic information in the course of representing clients." Philip R. Lochner, Jr.,
Lawyers and Insider Trading, 11 Bus. LAW. UPDATE, May/June 1991, at 1, 2.
46. Id
47. Id
48. Law Firms May Have Ethical Obligation to Report Insider Trading, Lochner Says, 23
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)'No. 6, at 168 (Feb. 8, 1991). Commissioner Lochner also noted
that if local bar associations'fail to properly regulate lawyers, the SEC may assume this respon-
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The very nature of the legal profession and the role of lawyers in
general suggest that increased regulation is needed in the insider trading
context where the confidentiality of client information is particularly im-
portant. Information is the currency of power for lawyers. Attorneys
act as information gatherers during the discovery process. They also act
as information storers, as demonstrated by the need for the attorney-cli-
ent privilege. As an industry in which advertising is not an accepted
means of attracting clients, being "in the know" is vital to client develop-
ment. One way to make potential clients aware that attorneys and firms
are experienced and well-connected is the strategic leaking of
information.
Professor Helen Garten argues that in some instances insider trad-
ing by professionals may further the interests of the professional's reputa-
tion or the reputation of her firm.49 Professor Garten notes that clients
may view securities lawyers as both information gatherers and informa-
tion storers:
That clients expect their professional advisers to be sources as well as
recipients of information alters the stakes involved in insider trad-
ing .... [I]f professional firms also serve as sources of valuable infor-
mation, then dealing in information, even inside information, may
further the goals of the firm by enhancing its reputation for knowledge
and expertise.50
Thus, clients will retain those law firms from which they receive expert,
knowledgeable legal advice. Attorneys are aware of this, and to attract
new clients they may reveal their involvement in particular transactions,
using "tipping ... as a signal of knowledge and expertise in specific ar-
eas." 51 Furthermore, attorneys are aware that the revelation of this in-
formation would probably have a greater impact on a potential client if it
were leaked prior to public announcements, and, therefore, may be in-
clined to engage in illegal tipping.
Thus, because of the unique nature of the legal industry, heightened
regulation of employees of law firms may be necessary to prevent misuse
of material, nonpublic information. Placing responsibility on the firms to
properly supervise and instruct these employees may be the most effec-
tive method of enforcement of the securities laws, especially since current
regulation often fails to directly address the insider trading problem.
sibility. In an address to the Federal Bar Association's Securities Law Committee, he stated,
"To the extent that bar associations fail adequately to sanction illegal and unethical conduct by
their members, the risk to the legal profession is greater that the government will take it upon
itself to find ways to penalize attorneys for misconduct." Id.
49. Helen A. Garten, Insider Trading in the Corporate Interest, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 573,
576 ("In some cases, the misuse of inside information by professionals may be the product not
of the triumph of self-interest over professional duty, but of a desire to further the interests of
the firm itself.").
50. Id. at 594.
51. Id. at 606.
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I. Current Regulation of Insider Trading and the Legal
Profession
A. Theories of Liability
In the practice of law, attorneys are often placed in positions where
they can intentionally or accidentally violate the federal securities laws
concerning the use of confidential information. This problem is particu-
larly acute for lawyers employed at large law firms with significant cor-
porate practices because those firms tend to have larger corporate clients
and are involved in larger transactions. In order to assess the measures a
law firm must take to prevent such violations, we must first briefly ex-
amine the present regulatory landscape.52
The arguments over whether to restrict the trading of securities on
the basis of material, nonpublic information are well settled. 53 The deci-
sion to forbid insider trading is based on the public policy favoring fair-
ness to each investor. This policy allows the investing public the
opportunity to make informed decisions through comprehensive and
equally accessible corporate information. In fact, one of the stated pur-
poses of the Securities Exchange Act is to "insure the maintenance of fair
and honest markets."'54
Although the term "insider trading" has never been legislatively de-
fined, such activity is proscribed by the federal securities laws under Sec-
tion 17(a) of the Securities Act of 193355 and Sections 10(b) 56 and 14(e)57
of the Securities Exchange Act. The most extensive and prominent se-
curities fraud theories have developed under Section 10(b) and SEC Rule
lOb-5.58 Most of these theories are especially relevant to law firms and
law firm employees.
52. For a more detailed analysis of securities fraud theories, see DONALD C.
LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING REGULATION (1990 ed.).
53. See supra notes 1, 5 & 18; see also William K.S. Wang, Trading on Material Nonpub-
lic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom
Under SEC Rule lOb-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 1217 (1981) (identifying who is injured by insider
trading on impersonal stock markets). But see HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND
THE STOCK MARKET 131-45 (1966) (arguing that insider trading provides an essential incen-
tive to entrepreneurs).
54. Securities Exchange Act § 2 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1988)). This sec-
tion acknowledges the necessity for regulation because "transactions in securities as commonly
conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets are affected with a national
public interest." Id.
55. Securities Act of 1933, cl. 38, 48 stat. 74, 84-85 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 77q
(1988)).
56. Securities Exchange Act § 10(b) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988)).
57. Securities Exchange Act § 14(e) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1988)).
58. Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the SEC pursuant to Congress's grant of authority under
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, is the SEC's primary antifraud statute. Rule lOb-
5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
July 1993]
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(1) Abstain or Disclose Rule
Insider trading case law requires an insider to disclose any material,
nonpublic information in her possession, or to abstain from trading.5 9
This concept was originally formulated when the stock market involved
face-to-face transactions. Presently, however, the large impersonal na-
ture of financial markets necessitates disclosure of nonpublic information
to the entire investing public prior to an insider's trading. 6° An insider of
a corporation must either announce the nonpublic material information
through a press release or press conference, or refrain from trading while
the information is still confidential. Failure to do so will violate the cor-
porate insider's duty to the company's shareholders.
By contrast, an attorney or other employee of a law firm hired by a
corporation and entrusted with sensitive, inside information does not
have the option of revealing confidential client information. Both the
attorney-client privilege61 and the attorney's duty of loyalty to the cli-
ent62 mandate nondisclosure. As a result she cannot trade in that com-
pany's securities while the information remains nonpublic because she
also has an insider's fiduciary duty to the client's shareholders.
This theory of liability is based on an expanded definition of who is
an insider. Although the term "insider" originally referred to officers
and directors of a publicly traded company, case law has broadened the
definition to encompass other persons. 63 In many instances, in the course
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a mate-
rial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992).
59. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961); see also Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (noting that a failure to disclose constitutes fraud only
where relation of trust exists between parties).
60. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848. Due to the nature of modem securities ex-
changes, a seller has no way of knowing who is buying her particular shares of stock, and
therefore would have no opportunity to inform the specific buyer of the information she
possesses.
61. This is not always true under the strictures of the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct. See infra Part III.C.2.
62. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(A) (1993); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(b) (1993).
63. Generally, the term "insider" refers to persons who hold high management positions
in a corporation, or persons who have been given sensitive information that only those persons
are normally privy to, with the understanding that the information is confidential. Texas Gulf
Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848.
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of a business relationship confidential information is passed to other indi-
viduals. The persons who receive sensitive information with the under-
standing that it is to remain confidential have the same fiduciary duty to
the company's shareholders as the insiders themselves. In the leading
case of Dirks v. SEC,64 the Supreme Court acknowledged that a member
of a law firm can possess a corporate insider's fiduciary duty to abstain
from trading on material, nonpublic information. 65 The Dirks case estab-
lished that a member of a law firm retained to act as a corporation's legal
counsel in a public offering or a corporate merger or acquisition is con-
sidered a temporary insider.66 Temporary insiders owe the same fiduci-
ary duties to a corporation as traditional corporate insiders.67
(2) Tipper/Tippee Liability
In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,68 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals prohibited both trading of securities and recommending securi-
ties for purchase while in possession of inside information, without dis-
closure of such information. 69 Thus, a "tipper," an insider who has
made a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend,70 of
inside information is as liable for securities violations as she would be if
she had placed the trade herself. In Dirks, the Supreme Court recog-
nized that a "tippee," a person who receives inside information with the
knowledge that the insider is breaching a fiduciary duty, is also liable for
insider trading when they trade on inside information.71 According to
the Court in Dirks, the securities laws are violated when an insider makes
a gift of confidential information to a relative or friend because "[tihe tip
and trade resemble trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of the
64. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
65. The Court stated:
Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is revealed
legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant working for the
corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the shareholders. The basis
for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that such persons acquired nonpublic
corporate information, but rather that they have entered into a special confidential
relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to
information solely for corporate purposes .... For such a duty to be imposed,
however, the corporation must expect the outsider to keep the disclosed nonpublic
information confidential, and the relationship at least must imply such a duty.
Id at 655 n.14 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
66. Id
67. Id.
68. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
69. Id at 848 (interpreting Rule lOb-5).
70. See Dirks, 463.U.S. at 664.
71. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659-60 n.19. "Tippees" of corporate insiders have been held liable
under § 10(b) because they have a duty not to profit from the use of inside information that
they know is confidential and know or should know came from a corporate insider. Chiarella
v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1980) (citation omitted).
profits to the recipient. ' 72 The Court recognized that the personal bene-
fit that an insider receives from tipping is not limited to pecuniary gain,
but may also include intangible gains such as enhancement of reputa-
tion.73 Thus, law firm employees who leak confidential client informa-
tion in breach of their fiduciary duty will be subject to tipper liability for
any trading by their tippees. Tipper liability will attach even if the tipper
leaked only to enhance the firm's reputation.
(3) Misappropriation
A less widely accepted theory imposes liability based on the misap-
propriation of information. This theory equates insider trading to theft
in that an individual who profits from improperly using insider informa-
tion is considered to have stolen information from his employer or client.
Under this theory, misappropriators of an employer's entrusted informa-
tion defraud their employers "[b]y sullying the reputations of [their] em-
ployers as safe repositories of client confidences. '74 Although the
Supreme Court has not yet adopted the misappropriation theory, 75 it has
been accepted in the Second,76 Third,77 Seventh, 78 and Ninth79 Circuits.
The misappropriation theory is especially relevant to law firms. At-
torneys and staff members can easily access information regarding a pub-
lic offering or a tender offer by a corporate client and use it for an
illegitimate purpose-insider trading. Law firm employees already have
been prosecuted for insider trading in these situations.80
72. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664.
73. Id. at 663.
74. U.S. v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981), aft'd after remand, 722 F.2d 729,
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
75. In Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987), an evenly divided Court af-
firmed securities fraud convictions brought pursuant to the misappropriation theory. "An af-
firmance by an evenly divided court is 'not entitled to precedential weight.'" United States v.
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 566 n.3 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192
(1972)).
The misappropriation theory has been forwarded by Chief Justice Burger. In Chiarella,
he stated in dissent, "Chiarella... misappropriated-stole to put it bluntly-valuable nonpub-
lic information entrusted to him in the utmost confidence. He then exploited his ill-gotten
informational advantage by purchasing securities in the market. In my view, such conduct
plainly violates § 10(b) and Rule lob-5." Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 245 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
76. See SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053
(1985); U.S. v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981), affd after remand, 722 F.2d 729, cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
77. See Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1985) (Higginbotham, J., concur-
ring), rev'd on other grounds after remand, 808 F.2d 252 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1017
(1987).
78. See SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 1991).
79. See SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 443 (9th Cir. 1990).
80. See, e.g., SEC v. Glauberman, Civ. Action No. 90 Civ. 5205 (S.D.N.Y July 16, 1992)
(law firm associate); SEC v. Hurton, et al., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 12097 (D. Mass. May 16, 1989)
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The new "controlling person" liability theory established in IT-
SFEA attempts to address misappropriation by requiring certain employ-
ers to reasonably anticipate and deter the misappropriation of client
information by instituting preventative insider trading policies and proce-
dures. Interestingly, prior to the development of controlling-person lia-
bility and ITSFEA, law firms were considered victims of the
misappropriation and insider trading of its employees. Now, however,
firms may be held liable for the insider trading of their employees if they
are reckless in failing to take preventative measures.
(4) SEC Rule 14e-3
The SEC promulgated Rule 14e-3 (the Rule),81 under section 14(e)
of the Securities Exchange Act,8 2 to address the specific problem of in-
sider trading in connection with tender offers. Rule 14e-3 is particularly
significant to attorneys and law firms because the language of the Rule
specifically covers the function of attorneys and law firms. The Rule pro-
hibits a person from trading in the securities of a company which is the
target of a tender offer once the bidder company has taken a substantial
step toward executing the bid, if the person knows or has reason to know
that the information is nonpublic and acquired from the bidder or target
company, their insiders, or "any other person acting on [a company's]
behalf."'8 3 Furthermore, the Rule prevents insiders, a company's "advi-
sors," or persons acting on behalf of insiders, from "communicat[ing]
material, nonpublic information relating to a tender offer to any other
person under circumstances in which it is reasonably foreseeable that
such communication is likely to result in [an insider trading]
violation." 84
Thus, attorneys or other employees of a law firm which has been
hired by a corporation to perform legal services in connection with a
(law firm paralegal); SEC v. Aksler, 86 Civ. 9811 (RO) (S.D.N.Y. March 2, 1988) (law firm
librarian); SEC v. David, 86 Civ. 9462 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1986) (law firm associate tipped
information concerning proposed or considered corporate takeovers); SEC v. Elliott, Civ. Ac-
tion No. 86C10184 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 30, 1986) (law firm partner purchased stock in client com-
panies that were involved in actual or contemplated takeovers); SEC v. Reich, 86 Civ. 7775
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 1986) (law firm partner tipped takeover information). Not all of these cases
were necessarily founded solely on the misappropriation theory. However, they still serve as
examples of how frequently situations can arise where the misappropriation theory might be
applied to the actions of law firm employees.
81. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1992).
82. Securities Exchange Act § 14(e) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988)).
83. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1992). The validity of the SEC's power to promulgate this
rule was affirmed by the Second Circuit in an en banc proceeding. United States v. Chestman,
947 F.2d 551, 563 (2d Cir. 1991).
84. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(d)(1) (1992).
tender offer would violate Rule 14e-3 if, while in possession85 of informa-
tion relating to the tender offer, they trade in securities of any companies
involved. In addition, they would be liable under the Rule if they pro-
vide other persons with the tender offer information, and these "tippees"
trade while in possession of the information. Considering the frequency
with which large law firms perform these kinds of services for their cor-
porate clients, Rule 14e-3 violations are clearly foreseeable.
(5) Respondeat Superior
The doctrine of vicarious liability or "respondeat superior" is the
common-law equivalent to controlling-person liability. Presently, most
of the federal circuits have held that controlling-person liability supple-
ments, but does not supplant, common-law respondeat superior doc-
trine.86 Under this doctrine, an employer is held liable for the actions of
its employee while the employee is acting within the scope of her employ-
ment.87 Respondeat superior may be applicable to law firms whose em-
ployees execute securities transactions based upon confidential
information they received through their employment with the firm.88
However, some courts have ruled that trading on the basis of material,
85. In this situation, the law firm employees would almost certainly be charged with the
knowledge that the information came from an insider and was nonpublic.
86. See, eg., Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1576-78 (9th Cir. 1990); In
re Atlantic Fin. Management, Inc., 784 F.2d 29, 32-34 (1st. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1072 (1987); Commerford v. Olson, 794 F.2d 1319, 1322-23 (8th Cir. 1986); Paul F. Newton &
Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1115-19 (5th Cir. 1980); Marbury Management
v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 712-16 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980); Holloway v.
Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690, 694-95 (6th Cir. 1976); Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731,
740-41 (10th Cir. 1974). The Seventh, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits have not
directly addressed this issue.
In Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 182-83 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 938 (1982), the Third Circuit allowed respondeat superior liability against broker-dealer
and accounting firms because of their positions in the public trust. However, the court cau-
tioned that the doctrine "should not be widely expanded in the area of federal securities regula-
tion." Id. The Fourth Circuit is split on the issue. Compare Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251,
259 (4th Cir. 1975) (holding that brokerage firm's liability for churning does not depend solely
on lack of effective supervision, but arises from employer's vicarious liability) with Carpenter v.
Harris, Upham & Co., 594 F.2d 388, 394-95 (4th Cir.) (refusing to hold brokerage firm liable
as "controlling person" after broker left firm, without evidence that broker acted at firm's
direction), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979).
87. See generally RESTATEMENT (2D) OF AGENCY §§ 228, 229, 257, 258, 261, 262, 265
(1958) (defining scope of employment and misrepresentation leading to principal's liability).
For an example of conduct held to be outside the scope of employment, see Lundberg v. State,
255 N.E.2d 177, 179-80 (N.Y. 1969) (absolving state as employer from liability for accident
caused by state employee driving to worksite eighty miles from home).
88. Some commentators believe that respondeat superior increases law firm liability to
third party investors because it is easier to prove than controlling person liability. David B.
Parker et al., Law Firm Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws, INSIGHT, Mar. 1992, at
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nonpublic information necessarily exceeds the scope of the insider's em-
ployment, thus absolving the employer of vicarious liability.8 9
B. Regulation by the SEC
(1) SEC Rule 2(e)
The SEC presently has the power to sanction lawyers and law firms.
Historically, however, the agency has exercised this power over the pro-
fession infrequently.90 SEC Rule 2(e) gives the SEC authority to tempo-
rarily or permanently suspend an attorney from practicing before it.91
Imposition of these sanctions prevents an attorney from participating in
any preparation of materials to be filed with the SEC.92 Furthermore,
while the SEC has stated that Rule 2(e) generally applies to individual
attorneys,93 it has also warned that "a firm may itself be enjoined 'by
name' and thus come within the terms of the Rule."' 94 The language of
the Rule provides additional support for the proposition that a firm can
be penalized. Rule 2(e)(1) does allow for the denial of the privilege of
practice before the SEC of "any person." In the following two subsec-
tions, the Rule refers to "any attorney." The use of both "attorney" and
"person" in the Rule suggests that 2(e)(1) can apply to non-natural "per-
sons" such as law firms. Thus, it appears that a law firm can be enjoined
from practicing before the Commission.95
Under the current formulation of the Rule, insider trading has
rarely, if ever, been the primary focus of a 2(e) proceeding. 96 This result
may be due to the SEC's harsh view of misrepresentations made in the
89. O'Connor & Assoc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179, 1194
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). But see FSLIC v. Shearson-American Express, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 1331,
1338-39 (D.P.R. 1987) (allowing plaintiff to argue that defendant could be liable for an em-
ployee's conduct under respondeat superior even though the conduct was "unauthorized").
90. One commentator estimates that only 121 attorneys were prosecuted under Rule 2(e)
proceedings between 1972 and 1989. Robert W. Emerson, Rule 2(e) Revisited: SEC Disciplin-
ing of Attorneys Since In re Carter, 29 AM. Bus. L.J. 155, 176 (1991). Of this number, only
twenty-six were prosecuted during the 1980s. Id. However, Emerson argues that the dearth of
2(e) proceedings is only temporary, since the fundamental conflict over the SEC's use of Rule
2(e) remains unsettled. Id at 166.
91. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1991). These sanctions can be appealed to the federal circuit
courts. 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a) (1988).
92. Rule 2(e) grants the SEC the power to deny persons the privilege of practicing before
the Commission. Rule 2(g) defines "practice" to include "(1) transacting any business with the
Commission; and (2) the preparation of any statement, opinion or other paper by any attorney,
... filed with the Commission in any registration statement, notification, application, report or
other document with the consent of such attorney." 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(g).
93. Amendment of Rule 2(e) of the Rules of Practice, Securities Act Release No. 5,147,
[1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) T 78,064 (May 10, 1971).
94. Id. ("Partners and associates of a disqualified firm, of course, may not practice before
the Commission so long as they remain members of or associated with the firm.").
95. Id
96. Emerson, supra note 90, at 211 n.278. According to Professor Emerson's research,
form of filings and documents related to the Commission's internal
processes. These actions are often absent in attorney insider trading
cases. In addition the SEC has made a practice of bringing 2(e) proceed-
ings against attorneys who already have been enjoined or convicted for
securities law violations by a court.97 "[The SEC], as a matter of policy,
generally refrains from using its administrative forum to conduct de novo
determinations of the professional obligations of attorneys.1'98 Conse-
quently, Rule 2(e) proceedings have not been used as an initial mecha-
nism for determining liability in the past decade.99
In a few instances, Rule 2(e) has been used to effect policy and pro-
cedure changes in law firms. In one case, In re Keating, Muething &
Klekamp,100 the SEC sanctioned a law firm for failing to disclose mate-
rial information in documents it had prepared for a client and filed with
the Commission.' 0 ' In imposing sanctions pursuant to Rule 2(e), the
Commission ordered the firm to "adopt, maintain, and implement addi-
tional internal and supervisory procedures .. .reasonably designed to
ensure that respondent has adequate procedures with respect to represen-
tation in matters involving the federal securities laws ... and to avoid
recurrence of [securities violations]." 10 2 However, the Commission did
not dictate what procedures should be instituted.10 3
In SEC v. Lerner, David, Littenberg & Samuel, °4 another proceed-
ing prior to the passage of ITSFEA, the SEC again sanctioned a law firm.
Lerner involved allegations of insider trading of information regarding a
client's patent by all of the partners of the firm, an associate, their family
members, their friends, and other firm clients. The SEC ordered the firm
to "comply with its undertaking to adopt, implement and maintain poli-
cies and procedures designed to prevent the use or dissemination of any
material, nonpublic information received by any member or employee of
[the firm] by virtue of, or during the course of, their employment."' 10 5
In 1977, the Commission issued a release warning law firms of their
responsibility to preserve the confidentiality of material, nonpublic infor-
insider trading has never been the focal point of a Rule 2(e) proceeding, and probably never
will be. Id.
97. Id. at 213.
98. Id. at 214.
99. Id.
100. 47 S.E.C. 95 (1979).
101. Id. at 97. Interestingly, this case involved the former law firm of Charles H. Keating,
Jr., who would later emerge as a major figure in the Savings and Loan scandals of the late
1980s.
102. Id. at 108.
103. Id. at 107.
104. Lit. Rel. No. 9049, 19 S.E.C. Docket 1153 (D.D.C. April 2, 1980) (consent decree).
105. Id.
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mation.106 The release stated that "[iaw firms, like others which have
confidential information in their possession that may affect the securities
trading markets, have an affirmative obligation to safeguard such infor-
mation." 10 7 In what could be seen as a precursor to the ideas formally
stated in ITSFEA, the release also stated that "law firms are encouraged
to establish policies and procedures regarding confidential information
and take steps to ensure that all firm personnel are familiar with those
policies, including the serious consequences that may result from con-
duct violating such policies."10 8
Through these proceedings, the SEC has demonstrated that it can
and will exert its authority to effect the internal policies and procedures
of law firms in situations in which the lack of such measures have im-
pinged on the internal processes of securities regulation. In general,
however, Rule 2(e) has been a little-used enforcement mechanism for in-
fluencing law firm governance.
(2) Self-Regulatory Organizations
The SEC currently delegates the first level of enforcement and sur-
veillance to self-regulatory organizations (SROs0 9).110 Ten national se-
curities exchanges, including the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), are SROs.
SROs are responsible for monitoring the activities of their own members
and assuring that they comply with the federal securities laws. Each of
these SROs must adopt rules "designed to prevent fraudulent and manip-
ulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable principles of
trade,... and, in general, to protect investors and the public interest."II
SROs must also provide fair disciplinary procedures for their mem-
bers. 112 SRO rules, although entitled to considerable respect, are not
binding on the courts or the SEC. 13 In fact, the SEC has extensive over-
sight and supervisory power over the SROs, and must approve all SRO
rules, policies, practices, and interpretations prior to their implementa-
106. Insider Trading by Law Firm Employees, Exchange Act Release No. 13,437, [1977-
78 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,116 (Apr. 8, 1977).
107. d
108. Id.
109. An SRO is an industry-sponsored group overseen by the SEC that promulgates rules
governing the conduct of their members. See Sam Scott Miller, Self-Regulation of the Securi-
ties Markets: A Critical Examination, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 853, 853 n. 1 (1985) (discuss-
ing the various functions of self-regulatory organizations).
110. See generally Report of Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Ex-
change Comm'n, H. R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st. Sess., at pt. 4, 692-728 (1964).
111. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b)(5) (1988), 78o(b)(6) (1988).
112. Securities Exchange Act § 6(b)(7) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(7) (1988)).
113. See Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963); see also Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache
& Co., 358 F.2d 178, 181-82 (2d Cir. 1966).
tion. The SEC may also add or abrogate such rules as it deems
necessary. ' 14
ITSFEA builds upon the regulatory relationship between the SEC
and the SROs by requiring certain controlling persons to establish and
enforce written policies aimed at preventing the misuse of material, non-
public information.1 5 As mentioned previously, ITSFEA makes regis-
tered broker-dealers and investment advisors liable for "knowingly or
recklessly fail[ing] to establish, maintain or enforce" policies and proce-
dures designed to prevent insider trading. 1 6 The statute increases the
SRO members' responsibility to prevent and detect securities fraud. IT-
SFEA also extends a certain degree of that responsibility to entities
which are not presently regulated by the SEC's SRO regulatory scheme
because ITSFEA provides controlling-person liability for nonregistered
entities which knowingly or recklessly disregard probable securities trad-
ing violations.117
C. Other Regulation of Attorney Conduct
Much of the current regulation of attorney conduct comes from lo-
cal and state bar associations. While each jurisdiction has a distinct body
of local statutes and case law governing ethical conduct by attorneys, this
Note focuses on ethical rules and guidelines which attempt to provide a
uniform national standard of conduct for the legal profession. There are
two such bodies of standards: the American Bar Association's (ABA)
Model Code of Professional Responsibility (ABA Code or Code), and the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility (Model Rules or
Rules).
The ABA Code was promulgated in 1969 and was adopted by many
states as the official standard of conduct for attorneys. In 1983, the ABA
sought to replace the Code by promulgating the Model Rules as a new
framework for ethical conduct in the legal profession. While many states
have adopted new ethics standards based on the Model Rules, some still
retain aspects of the ABA Code.' 18 Neither set of standards, however,
independently carries any binding legal effect; they are intended only as
models for the individual states to follow.
114. Securities Exchange Act § 19(c) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1988)).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(b)(1)(B) (1988).
116. Id.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(b)(1)(A).
118. The following jurisdictions have adopted new legal ethics rules based on the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct since the Rules were promulgated by the ABA in 1983: Ala-
bama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,
Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Wash-
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(1) AB4 Model Code of Professional Responsibility
The Code of Professional Responsibility' 19 attempted to provide
ethical guidelines that would prohibit insider trading by members of the
legal profession. Disciplinary Rule 4-101 states that an attorney may not
(1) reveal a client's confidence or secret, (2) use a confidence or secret to
the client's disadvantage, or (3) use a confidence or secret to the advan-
tage of the attorney or a third party without the client's consent upon full
disclosure. 120 Subsection (3) is most relevant to insider trading because
in most insider trading situations an attorney who trades while in posses-
sion of confidential information acts to her own advantage, not to her
client's disadvantage. Furthermore, an attorney need not reveal any con-
fidential information in order to personally benefit from insider trading.
Controlling-person liability is more relaxed under the Code than
under ITSFEA. Attorneys are required merely to exercise reasonable
care in preventing their employees or associates from disclosing or using
client confidences or secrets. 121 The ABA Code contains no other re-
quirements regarding a lawyer's supervisory responsibilities for her
subordinates.
The ABA Code appears to adequately prohibit insider trading by
individual attorneys. However, the Code fails to address the supervisory
responsibility of law firms or senior attorneys. Thus, states that currently
follow the ABA Code provide no additional obligations on law firm poli-
cies and procedures beyond the minimal requirements of ITSFEA's reck-
lessness standard.
(2) ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
There is no equivalent to Disciplinary Rule 4-101(B)(3) in the
Model Rules. Unlike the ABA Code, the Model Rules fail to directly
address the possibility of insider trading on behalf of attorneys. How-
ever, two rules partially address revelation of client information by an
ington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. ABA/BNA LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT (1992).
The following jurisdictions have adopted ethics rules incorporating both the-Model Rules
and the Model Code: Illinois, New York, North Carolina, Oregon and Virginia. Id
California's Rules of Professional Conduct follow neither the Model Rules nor the Model
Code. Id.
119. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980).
120. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(13) (1980). "Confi-
dence" refers to any information protected by the attorney/client privilege, and "secret" is
defined as any information that would be embarrassing or detrimental to the client, or that the
client has requested to be kept private. DR 4-101(A) (1980). An attorney has discretion to
reveal confidential information, however, if revelation (1) has been consented to by the client
after full disclosure, (2) is required by law or court order, (3) is necessary to prevent the client
from committing a crime, or (4) is necessary for the attorney to collect his fee or to defend
against any allegations of wrongdoing. DR 4-101(C) (1980).
121. DR 4-101(D) (1980).
attorney. Model Rule 1.6 prevents a lawyer from revealing information
that relates to the representation of a client without that client's con-
sent, 122 but is silent on the attorney's responsibility regarding the use of
such information. Rule 1.8(b) also partially addresses attorney misuse of
client information. It states: "A lawyer shall not use information relat-
ing to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless
the client consents after consultation .... ,,123
Taken together, these two Rules do not prohibit the execution of
securities trades based on confidential information resulting from the at-
torney-client relationship when such trades do not disadvantage the cli-
ent. While illegal insider trading may theoretically injure the company
whose securities are being traded, 124 such harm is considered highly
speculative. 125 Therefore, in most cases, attorneys who trade on informa-
tion they receive during the course of a client relationship do not violate
the Model Rules. While insider trading that does not disadvantage the
client is clearly prohibited by the federal securities laws, the Model Rules
fail to expressly prohibit such activity.
The Model Rules provide stronger guidelines than the Model Code
regarding attorney supervision of subordinates. Rule 5.1 addresses the
responsibilities partners or supervisory individuals in law firms have with
regard to subordinates. 126 Under Rule 5.1, partners, attorneys with in-
termediate supervisory responsibility, and shareholders of a professional
(legal) corporation are responsible for making "reasonable efforts to en-
sure that the [law] firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assur-
ance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the rules of professional
conduct." 127 The Model Rules also specifically address an attorney's re-
sponsibility regarding nonlawyer assistants. 128 They acknowledge that
122. However, an attorney may reveal confidential information if (1) the lawyer believes
that revelation of such information is necessary to prevent the client from committing a crime
resulting in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or (2) such information is needed to
exonerate the attorney from allegations made by the client or other party. MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1993).
123. MODEL RULE 1.8(b) (1993) (emphasis added).
124. See MARC STEINBERG & WILLIAM K. S. WANG, REGULATION OF INSIDER TRAD-
ING § 2.3.2 (forthcoming 1994) (discussing and criticizing arguments that insider trading will
impair management performance or increase the cost of capital).
125. See Wang, supra note 53, at 1230 (questioning argument to this effect by New York
Court of Appeals in Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912-13 (N.Y. 1969)).
126. MODEL RULE 1.10 cmt. 1 (1993) (defining "firm" to include lawyers in a private law
firm, lawyers in a legal department of a corporation or other organization, or in a legal services
organization).
127. MODEL RULE 5.1(a) (1993).
128. MODEL RULE 5.3 (1993). The comment accompanying Rule 5.3 states that "[a] law-
yer should give such assistants [as secretaries, investigators, law student interns, and
paraprofessionals] appropriate instruction and supervision concerning the ethical aspects of
their employment, particularly regarding the obligation not to disclose information relating to
representation of the client." MODEL RULE 5.3 cmt. (1993).
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the measures required of each law firm will vary depending on the firm's
structure and the nature of its practice. 129 The duties enumerated under
Rule 5.1 appear similar to the supervisory duties required under IT-
SFEA. However, these seemingly stringent guidelines are tempered by
the fact that supervisors only have a duty to seek conformity with the
rules of professional conduct as delineated by the Model Rules. Since, as
discussed above, the Model Rules themselves do not adequately address
insider trading, the requirement to adequately supervise subordinates to
comply with the Rules still fails to directly address the insider trading
problem.
At face value, allowing an industry to determine its own rules of
professional conduct appears to be a conflict of interest. The ABA's
most recent attempt to regulate attorney ethics, the Model Rules, has
resulted in lower ethical standards in the context of attorney confidential-
ity. The legal profession lacks a powerful, independent entity to set suffi-
cient guidelines for attorney conduct in relation to the problems
identified by ITSFEA. Furthermore, the enforcement of ethical guide-
lines by various local bar associations is irregular and often criticized.130
One commentator has observed with respect to the disciplining of
securities lawyers:
[For all [of the bar's] emphasis on self-regulation and state control,
the bar has not shown much concern with the Commission's need for
cooperation from state bar overseers. According to Commission per-
sonnel, the SEC has referred attorney misconduct to various [boards of
bar overseers], but in most cases these boards-without notifying the
Commission-took no action whatsoever. 131
The lack of adequate legislation on insider trading in the legal profession,
and the apparent lack of interest in enforcing the existing structures, sug-
gest that the current self-regulatory bars are inappropriate entities for
regulating attorney and law firm conduct for security violations.
In contrast, the SEC has attempted to expand its regulatory reach in
the name of improved professional conduct and fairness to the investing
public.' 32 Despite this attempt, the language of ITSFEA is ambiguous
regarding the responsibilities of law firms. The inherent ambiguities
found in ITSFEA only add to the potential ambiguities facing every law
firm. A more precise definition of lawyer and law firm responsibility
under ITSFEA would benefit the investing public by creating better se-
curities trading surveillance. It would also benefit the legal profession by
informing those in the profession what safeguards must be taken, and
what activities they can engage in without inadvertently violating the fed-
eral securities laws.
129. MODEL RULE 5.1 cmt. 2 (1993).
130. See Emerson, supra note 90, at 232-34.




The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the current regulatoiy
landscape for insider trading regulation of law firms is fraught with peril.
Under the current regulatory system, consisting of the federal securities
laws, rules promulgated by the SEC, and rules of professional ,conduct,
law firms are neither expressly required to establish written procedures to
prevent insider trading, nor given sufficient guidance fox implementing
appropriate procedures if they desire. The dual standards of liability
found in ITSFEA have led to a debate over the specific responsibilities of
law firms. The unique organizational structure of most law firms and the
ambiguity over the definition of a "controlling person" add to the diffi-
culties of interpreting the statute. Finally, there is an increased chancl
that "violations" will occur in this undefined area of doubt because attor-
neys are constantly entrusted with confidential information. Conse-
quently, firms are forced to speculate whether their attempts to comply
with the law are sufficient enough to avoid the sting of controlling-person
liability.133 As a result of this uncertainty, many firms lack the proper
safeguards necessary to prevent certain instances of insider trading.
In 1990, Richard Breeden, chairman of the SEC, remarked that
there are a "surprising number of law firms that [do] not have formal
procedures [for dealing with insider trading] in place." 134 For some
firms, ITSFEA may have its intended deterrent effect, but the resulting
regulatory procedures that have been implemented are either overly re-
strictive or inadequately preventative. Clearer guidelines are needed.
Under the current language of ITSFEA's dual standards of control-
ling person liability, only firms which are registered with the SEC,
namely broker-dealers and investment advisers, are specifically required
to establish, maintain and enforce insider trading procedures and poli-
cies.135 All other firms, including law firms, are held to a "reckless disre-
gard" standard that imposes liability on those firms which recklessly
disregard the fact that their employees are likely to violate the securities
laws by failing to take appropriate preventative measures. 136
This Note proposes that Congress amend ITSFEA to include law-
yers and law firms with broker-dealers and investment advisers under
133. Harvey L. Pitt et al., Law Firm Policies Regarding Insider Trading and Confidential-
ity, 47 Bus. LAW. 235, 239 (1991). The Subcommittee on Civil Litigation and Enforcement
Matters of the ABA's Section of Business Law Federal Securities Law Committee surveyed
law firms that already have insider trading policies in order to provide all firms with some
guidance in crafting a policy because so many law firms appear to have decided, on their own,
to adopt such policies based on their own interpretation of what safeguards are sufficient. Id.
The survey set forth a variety of sample policies to provide some much needed guidance.
134. SEC Finding Law Firms Lack Safeguards to Deter Insider Trading, Breeden Says, 22
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 1373, 1375 (BNA) (Sept. 28, 1990).
135. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(b)(1)(B).
136. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(b)(1)(A).
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ITSFEA's requirement to establish, maintain, and enforce policies and
procedures aimed at preventing insider trading. This amendment would
address several problems under the current system. First, increased
oversight of law firms through the imposition of an insider trading policy
and procedures requirement would help regulate a profession that, by its
nature, has the opportunity and the propensity 37 to trade or advise
others to trade securities while in possession of nonpublic information.
Second, the legal profession is so intimately involved with the function-
ing of the securities industry that law firms serving investment banks,
corporations, or other securities-related entities should assume height-
ened 'responsibility for detecting and preventing securities law violations
by monitoring their employees' use of inside information. Third, legisla-
tive action is needed because the present system of self-regulation in the
legal profession inadequately protects the investing public from illicit
trading. Finally, the legal profession needs better guidance to allow it to
properly achieve ITSFEA's original goals. The overriding concern in a
proposal to increase regulation of law firms by a government agency
should be to spread the cost and burden of securities surveillance to the
firms that derive a significant and direct benefit from the securities
industry. 138
In conjunction with amending ITSFEA, Rule 2(e) should be modi-
fied to grant the SEC additional authority over attorneys to manage and
enforce the new policy and procedures requirement. Authorizing the
SEC to oversee law firm compliance with the proposed policy and proce-
dures requirement would provide a second level of regulation over law
firm confidentiality. Furthermore, the SEC would give firms guidance as
to the limits and extent of their controlling person duties. As a well-
respected federal agency, the SEC is in an excellent position to oversee
nationwide regulation of securities fraud prevention measures. Through
Rule 2(e) the SEC already has the ability to sanction lawyers, and even
law firms. This proposal would expand this preexisting power.
As to the specific requirements of law firm policies, the House Com-
mittee provided some guidance regarding which procedures should be
included in any insider trading policy. These suggestions, found in the
House Report accompanying ITSFEA but not binding on its interpreta-
tion,139 should serve as the SEC's basic foundation for industry-wide pol-
icy. In the report, the Committee designated three areas of importance:
(1) restraining access to confidential information, (2) providing continu-
ing education programs concerning the sensitivity of certain information,
137. See suprp notes 45 & 80.
138. ITSFEA is apparently aimed more at spreading the cost of enforcement of the securi-
ties laws than at compensating victims of the improper trading. The Securities Exchange Act
expressly limits the amount of liability for the firm in certain situations. Securities Exchange
Act § 21A (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(b) (1988)).
139. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 19, at 22.
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and (3) restricting or monitoring the securities trading of employees. 14
All three of these procedures should be incorporated into a system of
guidelines that the SEC would provide for law firms under an expanded
version of Rule 2(e) and ITSFEA.
The SEC should set up a three-level program of policy and proce-
dure requirements. On the first level, firms that have practices involving
little or no contact with the securities industry or public corporations
would essentially only be held to the current recklessness standard. On
the second level, firms that have corporate clients would be responsible
for a basic system of antifraud measures similar to those suggested by the
House Committee. At the third and highest level, additional procedures
and policies should be ordered for firms that are major players in the
securities arena. The specific nature of these tougher standards should be
based on the present regulatory practices found in the securities industry.
Like other securities professionals, securities lawyers and firms fall-
ing into the third category should be required to register with the SEC in
order to practice before it. Those lawyers and firms registering with the
SEC would have to agree to be subject to the proposed criteria of the new
ITSFEA.
The SEC also has the expertise and experience to adjust the specific
criteria of law firm policies and procedures to account for differences in
the nature of various law firm business. To this end, the House Commit-
tee clearly stated that in the context of broker-dealer and investment ad-
viser regulation under ITSFEA, the SEC has broad authority to enforce
the statute's provisions. 141 Under the amendments proposed here, such
enforcement power would allow the SEC to tailor the enforcement of
ITSFEA to the unique problems found in the legal profession.
Just as the NASD, the NYSE, and the other SROs are the first level
of enforcement in the securities regulation pyramid, law firms are in the
best position to monitor and inform their employees of the responsibili-
ties and consequences of possessing material, nonpublic corporate infor-
mation. The legal profession should essentially act like a de facto SRO.
This role would minimize the amount of time and expense the SEC
would need to expend on securities enforcement of the legal community.
Of course, any increased oversight of the legal profession must be
carefully delineated. Regulation of the legal profession by the SEC must
be narrowly restricted. The SEC is a federal agency with the primary
purpose of monitoring the securities markets; inappropriate expansion of
its control of law firms could lead to abuse. By focusing SEC regulation
140. Id.
141. Id. The Committee stated that ITSFEA "provides the Commission with additional
broad rule-making authority ... and may require specific policies and procedures if it deems
such action necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
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on law firms that directly practice before and participate in the processes
of the SEC, this legislative proposal can achieve the goal of regulating
while restricting the SEC's control. Former SEC Chairman Harold Wil-
liams expressed a similar position with regard to the disciplining of indi-
vidual attorneys:
Rule 2(e) should not be utilized as an enforcement tool against those
who violate the federal securities laws and happen coincidentally also
to be lawyers or accountants. But where such individuals engage in
professional misconduct which impairs the integrity of the Commis-
sion's processes, the Commission has an obligation to respond through
the application of Rule 2(e). 142
The problem of insider trading by lawyers and law firm employees
straddles two industries which have distinctly different systems of admin-
istration and management. The securities industry has been highly regu-
lated by the government to insure fairness in a business susceptible to
fraud. On the other hand, the legal profession has remained largely self-
regulated, free from governmental reach. This proposal strikes a balance
between the legal profession's concerns about incursions on its indepen-
dence and the government's desire to protect inequitable behavior.
Allowing the government to regulate any part of the legal profession
will result in protest by the bar. The legal community has long resisted
any outside oversight of the profession's practices and has opposed any
attempt to create specialized sections of the bar. However, the time has
come for the legal community to share in the costs of securities regula-
tion just as it shares in the benefits of the market. In the specific context
of insider trading, clarification of law firm and attorney responsibility
would benefit the legal profession as well.
142. In the Matter of Keating, Muething & Klekamp, 47 S.E.C. 95, 120 (1979) (Williams,
Chairman, concurring).

